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Rbstract 
Several empirical considerations have emerged over the last decade, 
which are central to the debate on convergence of international 
income levels. For instance, there has been discussion over the use 
of total factor productivity, as opposed to income per capita or 
labour productivity, as the basis for convergence studies. Further, 
there is the question of sample selection: that is, what set of 
countries should be used. Many other considerations, such as the use 
of trended data, the robustness of results over time, the use of 
purchasing power parity estimates, and errors in estimation, are 
also at issue. This essay will examine these issues, and discuss 
them in the context of several well known empirical studies. 
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1 
The debate regarding convergence of international income levels has, 
over the past several years, been characterised by many studies, 
several of which have concentrated on empirical evidence. A 
considerable part of the debate has focussed on how the evidence 
should be read, and what it actually says. As a result, there has been 
a wide range of discussion as to each study's validity. It will be the 
purpose of this paper to look at and perhaps add to some of the 
empirical issues surrounding the convergence literature. 
I.Some Emoirical Issues Surrounding the Conuergence 
Debate 
i. Conuergence of Income Leuels. Labour Productiuity 
Leuels. or Total Factor Productiuity? 
It seems curious that different studies of the convergence 
hypothesis have focussed on different economic variables. Although 
per capita income is the most common unit which we can check for 
convergence (Baumol and Wolff, "Productivity Growth, Convergence, 
and Welfare: Reply" [1988]), also looked at are labour productivity 
levels (Abramovitz,"The Catch-Up Factor In Postwar Economic 
Growth [1989], Baumol,"Productivity Growth, Convergence, and 
Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show" [1986], and so on), or total 
factor productivity (TFP) (Dowrick and Nguyen,"OECD Comparative 
Economic Growth 1950-85: Catch-Up and Convergence" [1989]). 
Although labour productivity levels and per capita income levels are 
relatively good proxies of each other (at least according to 
Maddison's (1982) sample where there is a correlation between the 
two of .98) 1 and are thus frequently used interchangeably, what of 
TFP? It is necessary for the sake of consistency that we have a 
common unit of reference. If we are to check for convergence, there 
has to be a consensus on Convergence Of What? 
Dowrick and Nguyen present compelling evidence for the use of TFP 
as the measure of choice. Although I will go into greater detail on 
this paper later, I will very briefly discuss their views here. Any 
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study, they warn, that reports on income levels yet fails to also 
report on TFP, will be incomplete2 . This is because TFP as a catch-
up factor will account for any income convergence which may have 
taken place3 . They show that increases in relative factor intensities 
are not the primary sources of catch-up. In many of the poorer 
countries, changes in relative factor intensities have partly masked 
any convergence in income levels which may have taken place via 
TFP catch-up, (for instance, low investment levels in many African 
and South American countries relative to growth in their population 
levels). They show that there has been a robust and steady tendency 
for TFP catch-up since 1950, and this includes the period from 
1973-85. This result also holds for a larger sample size (sixty three 
countries) than many of the convergence studies to date (Baumol 
[1986], Delong, "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: 
Comment" [1988]). It would be erroneous to suggest that income 
levels for some sample have not converged without first analysing 
TFP4 . Dowrick and Nguyen show that even though income levels may 
not have converged, the corresponding TFP levels do have this 
tendency. At least, this is their argument. 
I have only briefly discussed Dowrick and Nguyen's paper, and 
will return to it later, but at present we are concerned with the 
merits of using TFP as the variable of choice. Although their 
argument is interesting, there is another story. Dowrick and 
Nguyen's TFP estimates are very misleading. A study that only takes 
into account the quantity of capital and labour inputs (such as 
Dowrick and Nguyen's), and not the quality levels, is assigning far 
too much importance to TFP. This can be seen in Christensen, 
Jorgensen, and Cumming's in their "Economic Growth, 1947-73: An 
International Comparison". By taking the quantity and quality of 
Factor Input (where quality of labour is measured in terms of 
education, and quality of capital is measured in terms of the ratio of 
capital services to the capital stock) for nine industrialised 
countries from 1960 to 1973, Christensen et al. compare real Factor 
Input and TFP as determinants of growth in real Product. The result 
is that, for four of their countries, TFP is more important; for the 
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other five, however, Factor Input is more important. They then do the 
same experiment, but this time eliminating quality from the 
measure of Factor Input: they find that TFP is a more important 
determinant of real Product growth than is Factor Input for all nine 
countries. They conclude that 
omission of changes in quality of capital stock and 
hours worked would result in a completely distorted 
view of the relative importance of growth in 
real Factor Input and growth in TFP in accounting 
5 for the growth of real Product. 
In addition, they also found that all nine countries in their sample 
experienced quality increases from 1960 to 1973, thus making it 
clear that any analysis which is based on capital and labour inputs 
and their role in real Product growth, but does not also incorporate 
quality changes, will end up assigning TFP a much larger role in 
explaining real Product growth than is warranted. 
In light of this criticism, I believe that TFP alone cannot serve as 
a measure of convergence. Further, its usefulness is questionable, at 
least until a comprehensive study on international TFP comparisons 
is carried out which takes into account quality of Factor Input. 
ii.Samole Selection Bias 
The question of sample selection has been raised by several 
(Dowrick and Nguyen[1989], Delong[1988]). That is, What criterion is 
to be used to select the countries which will be tested? Baumol 
(1986), which will be looked at in more detail later, uses an ex 
poste sample for 1870-1979, where the criterion was to include 
countries whose per capita incomes had reached a certain point by 
the end-point of 1979. This is necessary because he uses Maddison's 
(1982) sample, which is entirely made up of relatively rich 
countries. Countries which have not converged are systematically 
excluded from the sample. But clearly this amounts to fixing the 
outcome, in that obviously since the countries were all rich in 1979 
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then convergence would be shown to have occurred6' An outcome that 
shows convergence is therefore trivial; it does not show that 
convergence is a phenomenon that should or should not be expected 
in other countries. Clearly, a sample that is based on some ex ante 
criterion would be preferred. Indeed; it has been shown that 
when countries are chosen on the basis of such a criterion, the 
results are very different from Baumol's (see Delong[1988], and 
Baumol and Wolff [1988], both of which will be discussed later). 
As a somewhat minor additional point regarding sample selection 
bias, it should be noted that the existence of National Accounts is a 
luxury which, historically, only the richer countries could afford. 
Thus in searching for data sources from which one can draw a 
sample, one is faced with a preponderance of countries that are 
relatively rich 7 . 
Carrying on, it can be argued that even the ex ante criterion 
which typically looks to the relative income levels of sample 
countries at the start date (Delong), or the mid-point date (Baumol 
and Wolff), may be an inadequate representation of the likelihood of 
a country to converge. As Abramovitz points out, the path to 
convergence depends on many things; in particular, social 
compatability (i.e. similar political, social, and economic 
institutions, as well as technical competence) and technological 
congruence (i.e. a country's raw materials, capital, and labour 
skills) 8 . It is clearly not enough that a country exhibit a high enough 
income level to make it a candidate for catching-up, (indeed, this 
point is supported by the data for countries such as Argentina, Chile 
and Portugal) 9 . Therefore maybe a better ex ante criterion would 
look more closely at 'social compatability' or 'technological 
congruence', rather than income levels. Some possible proxies might 
be literacy levels, the existance of democratic political 
institutions, or a country's labour skills or natural resource base. It 
is interesting to note that Delong (1988), while using 1870 per 
capita income levels as his ex ante criterion, did check the 
significance of dummies for both democracy and religion, in that 
perhaps they would best represent social compatability. He found 
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that Democracy was not a significant determinant of growth and 
convergence, but that Protestantism was; " ... the main message is 
that, for the ... sample of 22, a country's religious establishment has 
been a surprisingly good proxy for the social capability to 
assimilate modern technology" 10 . 
iii. Samole Size 
In addition to the issue of sample selection bias, there is the 
related issue of sample size. Some studies, such as Baumol's (1986) 
which uses Maddison's sample of sixteen countries, and Delong's 
(1988) which uses twenty-two countries, use a relatively small 
sample of countries, whereas others - mainly those who incorporate 
the Summers and Heston data (1984; 1988) - have a much larger 
sample size (such as Dowrick and Nguyen [1989], or the 1950-80 
results of Baumol and Wolff[1988]). Those using the larger samples 
typically have found no convergence for the broader sample, and thus 
have looked for convergence by whittling the sample down, (Baumol 
and Wolff find no convergence for seventy-two countries, but mild 
convergence for roughly thirty-six countries, and strong convergence 
for fifteen; Dowrick and Nguyen find only marginal convergence for 
twenty-seven countries, and none for any samples above twenty-
seven; results of both papers will be discussed later). Those using 
the smaller samples have in some cases found convergence 
(Baumol[1986], Abramovitz[1989]), and in other cases have not 
(Delong[1988]). My concern, besides the lack of consistency in 
results, is that any study that does not seek to incorporate as broad 
a sample as possible, will be missing the big picture. The benefits of 
using a large sample is that one can check for convergence for the 
whole sample, as well as different sub-groups, and report on each, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of bias due to too small a sample as 
well as bias due to sample selection problems. 
iv. Period Considered 
A further concern is the range of periods covered in different 
studies. Obviously convergence studies will be limited by the 
availability of data. Those using the Summers and Heston 
(1984;1988) data are confined to 1950-80, with some 
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supplementing it via the OECD estimates for the 1980's (Dowrick and 
Nguyen). Those using the Maddison data are 'limited' to 1870-1979. 
And of course there are other sets of data, such as Bairoch (1976) 
which covers 1830-1913. The lack of consistent methodology across 
these sources makes it impossible to seriously consider pooling 
them all for one massive period 11 (I will briefly go into this in my 
discussion of Delong[1988]). However, it is equally clear that 
studies which are looking at different start and end dates cannot 
successfully refute one another. Even if one massive source were 
available for all the years in question, the determination of start 
and end dates will in turn determine the sample selection (whether 
it be ex paste or ex ante) since the countries to be included in the 
samples will almost certainly differ with each other from year to 
year in terms of their income levels or social compatability. (Indeed, 
any sample that covers an exceptionally long period will be faced 
with the problem of the very existance of certain countries, such as 
Yugoslavia, Germany, or Italy). 
v. Purchasing Power Paritu Estimates 
In recent years, more use has been made of purchasing power 
parity estimates of international income levels, growth rates, and 
so on, (where PPP is defined as the number of units of currency A 
required to buy the same amount of goods that a unit of numeraire 
currency B can buy). OECD results (for the eighties) (M.Ward[1985]), 
and Summers and Heston (1984 or 1988) (for 1950-80) are two 
sources in particular. These comparisons are preferable to those 
using market exchange rates as the basis for international 
comparisons (such as Maddison [1982] 12 , and also Bairoch [1976] 13). 
Since market exchange rates tend to be volatile, international 
estimates may vary drastically from year to year, and in doing so 
are not always reflective of reality. Yet still, as Irving Kravis and 
Robert Lipsey point out, 
The predominant method ... is to convert own-
currency value aggregates to a numeraire 
currency, usually the (U.S.) dollar, via exchange 
rates ... Exchange rate conversion is still the 
common practice, despite clear evidence that 
exchange rates fail to reflect the relative 
purchasing power of currencies, sometimes 
being off by a factor of three. 14 
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Further, "A persistent finding ... is that the purchasing power of the 
currency of low-income countries is much greater than indicated by 
the exchange rates." 15 They point to the examples of South American 
and Asian countries, whose real per capita income was more than 
twice as much as suggested by exchange rate conversions. 16 
It is important to remember this, especially in view of those studies 
which have used non-PPP estimates and have found a lack of 
convergence when the sample size includes poorer countries, (such 
as Delong[1988]). 
To further emphasise the importance of using PPP estimates, I 
look to Helliwell and Chung's "Macroeconomic Convergence: 
International Transmission of Growth and Technical Progress" where 
they find that their results for convergence are greatly affected by 
the use of PPP's instead of market exchange rates; the use of PPP's 
decreases the international variation in income, thus increasing the 
tendency for the data to converge. They also point to the fact that 
when they use two different sets of data based on exchange rates 
for different base years (1980 and 1985), there are significant 
differences in results with respect to convergence, (this makes 
sense because exchange rates vary from year to year). They 
consistently find, however, that the use of PPP's, while it not only 
is theoretically preferable, also increases the tendency for per 
capita income convergence to occur, in their sample of nineteen 
industrialised countries from 1960-85. 1 7 
8 
A final point regarding PPP estimates is that some may be 
concerned as to the methodology employed, and if using different 
sources of PPP results will alter the outcome of a test of 
convergence. Suffice it to say that not only did Dowrick and Nguyen 
find almost zero change when going from one source to another, but 
also found a correlation of about .95 between different sets of PPP 
estimates (Summers and Heston[1984], Blades and Roberts [1987], 
and the OECD estimates (M.Ward[1985]). 18 
vi. Measurement Error 
Systematic errors in estimating early income levels from a 
common base year may also lead to bias. As Abramovitz (1989) and 
also Delong (1988) point out, initial-year income levels in most 
long-period data are obtained by backward extrapolation of later 
levels, via growth rates. Therefore, errors in the growth rates 
produce an inverse correlation between initial income levels and 
subsequent growth rates, thus biasing the results in favour of 
convergence .19 (More precisely, if the cumulative errors in the 
backward extrapolation are significant compared to the actual 
differences in levels of income then results may be biased in favour 
of convergence). For example, if the data for growth rates tends to 
be less than the true values, then the initial income level (which has 
been estimated via the growth rates) will appear higher than its 
true value; thus there will be an inverse correlation between the 
estimated initial income level and the subsequent growth rates, thus 
tending to confirm the convergence hypothesis. A solution to this 
problem is shown by Delong [1988] in his use of the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation technique, (rather than Ordinary Least 
Squares). Delong shows that, since OLS assumes measurement error 
in the dependent variable is non-existent, MLE can be used instead, 
and thus allow for any degree of measurement error; on page 14, I 
show how Delong's dependent variable refelects income growth rate 
9 
from 1870-1979, and is regressed on initial 1870 income level. He 
estimates the equation several times via MLE, each time assuming a 
different level of error in the dependent variable (i.e. growth rate). 
I will go into his specific results later. 
vii. Trended Data 
It is surprising to me that more studies do not make use of 
trended data in their experiments. It is clearly an important aid to 
determining whether convergence has occurred. For example, if two 
countries are being tested, and the first country in the initial year 
is in the trough of a business cycle but the other country is not, and 
the first country in the end year is on the crest of a cycle but the 
other country is not, then there is a strong bias in favour of 
convergence; but of course it is only an illusion, due to the nature of 
the cyclical distortion. 20 Also, the distortion may be different than 
my above example, in which case there could be bias against 
convergence. Thus the use of trended data would rid the data of 
these cycles. There are different methods for purging the data of 
cyclical components; in particular, the method of moving averages 
can be used, in which a series of averages is taken from the data, 
each representing the mean of a fixed interval, where the size of the 
interval depends on the frequency of the distortion. The result is a 
set of values for which the variation due to the cyclical component 
has been reduced. The point is made by Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) 
that the use of nontrended data has led to masking of convergence 
among the OECD since 1973. Indeed, they find that the 
results of Abramovitz (1986) as well as Baumol and Wolff (1988) 
that since 1973 convergence among the richer countries has either 
stopped or reversed, are significantly different in the light of 
trended data.21 Using trend income levels, Dowrick and Nguyen show 
that some convergence within the OECD has in fact occurred since 
1973. 
10 
viii. Stability of Results O uer Time 
As a final note, it is clear that one must ensure that any results 
regarding convergence are stable over time. In order to show, for 
example, that convergence between 1950 and 1980 is not simply the 
result of, say, post-WWII reconstruction, it is necessary to 
divide the data into subperiods such as 1950-60, 1960-73, and 
1973-80, and see if the convergence trend has continued past the 
immediate post-war years. Further, if the convergence hypothesis is 
to make sense, then one expects growth rates to be decreasing over 
time as incomes increase. Thus in order to show this tendency, one 
must divide into subperiods to see if this is truly what is happening. 
To support the convergence hypothesis, growth rates must be 
decreasing as their corresponding income levels get closer to the 
leader. If this is not shown then one cannot accept a convergence 
hypothesis necessarily since the increase in income levels may not 
be due to catch-up. 
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11. Results of Fiue I moortant Conuergence Studies 
i. Results of: 
William J. Baumol "Productiuity Growth. Conuergence. and 
Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show" 
Growth Rate 
2.8 
2.6 
2.4 
2.2 
= 
2.0 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
o 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
1870 GDP Per Work Hour 
In 1 970 U.S. $ Relatiue Prices 
Figure 1 
1.2 1.4 
Productiuity Growth Rate, 1870-1979 us. 1870 leuel 
As indicated in Figure 1, Baumol finds a strong inverse correlation 
between initial productivity levels and subsequent growth rates. His 
regression equation is: 
Growth Rate(1870-1979) = 5.25 - .751n(GDP per work hour, 1870) 
R2 = .88 
Baumol concludes that there has been significant convergence 
amongst the "Maddison's sixteen" country sample. 
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His sample consists of the following sixteen countries: Australia, 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Italy, 
Denmark, United States, Austria, Germany, Norway, France, Finland, 
Sweden, Japan. 
Source: Maddison (1982) 
ii. Results of: 
J. Bradford Delong. "Productiuity Growth. Conuergence. 
and Welfare: Comment" 
First, he reproduces the results of Bau mo I (1986): 
Table 1 - Regressions Using Maddison's SiHteen Countries 
Independent Dependent Slope standard Error 
Uariable Uariable Constant Coefficient of Estimate R2 
LN of 1870 nnn. °lo 5.251 -0.749 0.14 .87 
Productiuity Productiuity 0.075 
Growth 
LN Of 1870 Log Diff.of 8.457 -0.995 0.15 .88 
Income 1979 and 0.094 
1870 Income 
Source: data from Maddison (1982) 
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Figure 2 
Per Capita GNP Regression For Maddison's SiHteen 
Then, he alters the sample to become the "Once-Rich Twenty-two" 
countries, which are: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, Austria, 
Canada, Denmark, United States, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, Australia, East Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, Chile, Portugal, Argentina, New Zealand: 
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Figure 3 
1870 Per Capita Income Hnd Subsequent Growth 
For The Once-Rich Twenty-two 
Delong estimates the following system via Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation: 
(1979 lncome)-(True 1870 Income)= a + b(True 1870 Income) + ei 
where (Estimated 1870 lncome)=(True 1870 Income) + ni 
(ei and ni are random error terms, and are assumed uncorrelated) 
{True 1870 Income is not observed) 
This system is identified if one assumes ei and ni are uncorrelated, 
and that the ratio of their variances can be defined as 
rho=var, n./var.e .. I I 
Rho is meant to represent the size of the measurement error 
relative to the size of the regression disturbance ei. The results are 
as follows: 
Table 2- MaHimum Likelihood Estimation 
For The Once-Rich Twenty-Two, 1870-1979 
Standard 
Standard Standard Error 
Slope Error Error in 1870 
rho Coefficient JJ of Slope of Regression PCI 
o.o -0.566 0.144 0.207 0.0 
0.5 -0.292 0.192 0.192 0.136 
1.0 0.110 0.283 0.170 0.170 
2.0 0.669 0.463 0.134 0.190 
00 1.381 0.760 o.o 0.196 
source:data from Maddison (1982) 
2.4 
2.2 
Log Per Capita 
Income Growth 2.0 
1870-1979 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0~-~~~~~~~--~~--~~--~~ 
6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 7 7 .2 7 .4 7 .6 
Log Per Capita Income in 1870 
Figure 4 
MaHimum Likelihood Estimation 
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For The Once-Rich Twenty-Two, 1870-1979 
Delong also tries using 1913 as a start date, in order to further be 
sure that measurement error has not altered his fundamental 
results: 
1.6 
1.4 
Log Per Capita 
income Growth 1.2 
1913-1979 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
co 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6_._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
6.4 6.6 6.8 1 1.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8 
Log Per Capita Income in 1913 
Figure 5 
MaHimum Likelihood Estimation For The 
Once-Rich Twenty-Two, 1 913-1979 
Table 3- MaHimum Likelihood Estimation For The 
Once.:.Rich Twenty-two, 1913-1979 
Standard 
Standard Standard Error 
Slope Error Error in 1870 
rho Coefficient n of Slope of Regression PCI 
-0.333 0.116 0.171 0.0 
-0.140 0.136 0.151 0.107 
0.021 0.158 0.133 0.133 
0.206 0.191 0.106 0.150 
0.444 0.238 0.0 0.167 
Source: Maddison ( 1982) 
Delong concludes that for neither 1870-1979 
nor 1913-1979 is there any significant convergence. 
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As a further indication of how drastic can be the effects of sample 
selection bias, Delong presents the following comparison of his 
"once-rich twenty-two" sample and Baumol's "Maddison's sixteen" 
17 
sample, where Baumol's sample indicates convergence, but Delong's 
does not: 
Table 4- Standard Oeuiations Of Log Output For 
Maddison's SiHteen Rnd The Once-Rich Twenty-Two 
sample 
Maddison's 16 
once-Rich 22 
1870 
.411 
.315 
source:data Maddison (1982) 
iii. Results of: 
1913 
.355 
.324 
1979 
.145 
.329 
William J. Baumol and Edward N. Wolff. "Productiuity 
Growth. Conuergence. and Welfare :Reoly" 
Using Paul Bairoch's (1976) data for eleven European countries from 
1830 -1913, they find evidence of convergence for the top ten 
countries since 1880, but not for all eleven: 
Coefficient of 
Uariation 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
o. 15 
o. 1 
0.05 
0.0 
-:-- - ___,,,/ 
/ 
/ 
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1913 
Year 
Figure 6 
Coefficient of Uariation GNP Per Capita, 1830-191 3. 
Bairoch Countries, 1870 Ranking. B Top 8 Countries; 
--- Top 9 Countries; __ Top 1 O Countries; +++Top 11 Countries 
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Now they expand the sample to .seventy-two countries, using 
Summers and Heston data (1984), and alter the period to 1950 -
1980. Apparently to obtain a more readable pattern, they construct 
ten-country moving averages, (the first set made up of the ten 
poorest countries in the sample in 1950, the second set adding the 
eleventh lowest and removing the first lowest, and so on). They get 
the following: 
Growth Rate, 
R6DP, 
1950-1980 
1 o country 
Auerage 
(Percent 
Per Year) 
3.5 
3.0 
2.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 ---
0.0+-------------------~ 
0 500 1000 1 500 2000 2500 3000 3500 
1950 RGDP, 1 o Country Auerage 
Figure 7 
Growth Rate, RGOP ( 1950-80) us. 1950 
RGOP 10-Country Mouing Ruerage, 72 
Countries Ranked BY 1950 RGDP 
(Summers and Heston Data) 
In the above figure, it is shown that the poorer countries have 
tended to diverge, while the richer countries have tended to 
converge. Roughly half the sample of seventy-two falls into the rich 
(convergence) category, and half into the poor (divergence) category. 
A further indication of convergence among the rich countries is 
indicated in the following: 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
coefficient 
of 0.1 
llariation 
0.05 
0.0 
1950 1 955 1960 1965 1 970 1975 1980 
Year 
Figure 8 
Coefficient of Uariation, RGDP, 1950-1981, For 
Sets Of Countries By 1950 RGDP Rank 
--- Top 1 O Countries;_ Top 14 Countries; 
+++Top 20 Countries; g Top 24 Countries 
Baumol and Wolff report regressions for the seventy-two country 
sample as follows: 
lnRatio= .586 + .00038RGDP50 - (9.9/107)RGDP50 
(4.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
2 
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R =.07 N=72 
where Ratio= (1980RGDP/1950RGDP) and RGDP50= per capita GDP in 
1950. 
They also try the following regression: 
In Ratio= .658 + .00019RGDP50 - .00044 01900 
(5.8) (1.9) (2.2) 
2 R =.07 N=72 
where 01900 = RGDP if RGDP ;::: $1900 
= 0 if RGDP50 < $1900 
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They also look at the seventeen richest countries independently: 
Ratio = 3.3 - .00038RGDP50 
(7.7) (12.5) 
(thus, strong evidence of convergence in this group) 
And the fifty-five poorest countries independently: 
Ratio = 2.1 + .0005RGDP 
(5.5) (1.3) 
N=55 (thus, weak evidence of divergence in this group) 
iv. Results of: 
Moses Rbramouitz. "The Catch-Up Factor In Postwar 
Economic Growth" 
Abramovitz looks at the sample of Maddison's sixteen countries (i.e 
same as those used by Baumol [1986]) from 1870-1979, and 
supplements this by also looking at the same sample, but from 
1913-1986. 
Source: Maddison (1982) and Maddison (1989) 
Table 5 
Comparatiue Leuels of Productiuity, 1870-1986 
Means and Relatiue Uariance of the Relatiues of 15 
Countries Compared with the United States 
(U.S. GDP per hour= 100) 
Means 
A 
1870 77 
1890 68 
1900 
1913 61 
1929 57 
1938 61 
1950 46 
1960 52 
1973 69 
1979 75 
1986 
Coefficients of Uariation 
B A B 
52 
52 
43 
65 
76 
.51 
.48 
.33 
.29 
.22 
.36 
.29 
.14 
.15 
.39 
.35 
.31 
.16 
.14 
Sources: A Columns Maddison (1982) B Columns Maddison (1989) 
Abramovitz points out that the cross-country variation in 
productivity levels fell from 50% of the mean in 1870 to 15% in 
1986. This is supportive of the convergence hypothesis. 
Table 6 
The Hssociation (Rank Correlation) Between Initial 
Leuels and Subsequent Growth Rates of Labour 
Productiuity (GDP per hour in 16 Countries), 
1870-1986 
Discrete Periods Lengthening Periods 
1870-1890 
1890-1913 
1913-1929 
1929-1938 
1938-1950 
1950-1960 
1960-1973 
1973-1979 
1900-1913 
1913-1950 
1950-1973 
1973-1986 
Based on Maddison (1982) 
-.32 1870-1890 
-.56 1870-1913 
-.35 1870-1929 
-.57 1870-1938 
+.48 1870-1950 
-.81 1870-1960 
-.90 1870-1973 
-.13 1870-1979 
Based on Maddison (1989) 
-.51 1900-1986 
-.18 
-.96 
-.53 
Sources: Maddison (1982) and Maddison (1989) 
-.32 
-.59 
-.72 
-.83 
-.16 
-.66 
-.95 
-.97 
-.96 
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Abramovitz looks at the above table, and notices that the inverse 
correlation between initial labour productivity levels and 
subsequent labour productivity growth rates is -.97 across 109 
years. That is, the less productive a country was, the faster were its 
ensuing growth rates. He says this also supports the convergence 
hypothesis. 
Abramovitz concludes that convergence has indeed occurred, across 
both periods observed, for Maddison's sample of sixteen countries. 
v. Results of: 
Steue Dowrick and Due-Tho Nguyen. "OECD Comoaratiue 
Economic Growth 1950-85: Catch-Uo and Conuergence" 
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Dowrick and Nguyen use the Summers and Heston (1984) data for 
1950-80, and supplement it with the OECD data for 1981-85. They 
initially only look at the OECD countries, but later expand the set to 
include all seventy-two countries. 
Table 7- The Dispersion Of Per Capita GDP Leuels 
Hmong 24 DECO Countries 
1950 1960 1973 1985 
n. Summers and Heston Data 
Weighted Mean 2508 3360 5567 6760 
Unweighted Mean 2274 3034 5035 6078 
Standard Deuiation 1034 1108 1405 1674 
Coefficient of Uariation 0.45 0.37 0.28 0.28 
Standard Deuiation of Log 0.51 0.44 0.35 0.33 
B. OECD Data 
Coefficient of Uariation 0.46 0.39 0.30 0.29 
Standard Deuiation of Log 0.56 0.50 0.40 0.37 
c. Summers and Heston Data, Trend Estimates 
Coefficient of Uariation 0.45 0.36 0.28 0.27 
Standard Deuiation of Log 0.52 0.44 0.35 0.32 
Sources: Summers and Heston (1984), OECD Ward(l 985) 
By looking at the above table (in particular the coefficients of 
variation) Dowrick and Nguyen find evidence of convergence for all 
three sets of data for the 24 OECD countries. 
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Table 8-Comparisons of Trend Growth Rates of the Richer 
and Poorer halues of the OECD Annual Auerage 
Percentage Rates of Change of Per Capita GDP 
1950-60 1960-73 1973-85 1950-85 
Richer Countries 
Ruerage Growth 2.3 3.1 1.5 2.3 
Standard Oeuiation 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 
Poorer countries 
Ruerage Growth 4.2 5.1 1.9 3.1 
Standard Oeuiation 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.9 
I-Statistic 3.1 4.1 1.3 4.6 
Source:Rs for table 1 
Notes: Rll Calculations based on trend estimates.The rich and poor halues are 
defined by their trend income leuels at the beginning of each period. The t-
statistic tests the null hypothesis that the auerage growth rates of the two 
subsamples are the same. 
The above table also shows evidence of convergence, in that the 
poorer half of the OECD grew faster than the richer half over the 
same period, as the convergence hypothesis predicts. 
Table 9-Regression Analysis of Relatiue Growth 1950-85 
t= 
E 
1950 
-1.57 
(5.6 7) 
1950 
-2.01 
(9.6 7) 
0.58 
(3. 74) 
0.064 
(2.54) 
Notes: The dependent uariable is the trend growth rate (percent per annum) 
of real GOP. EHplanatory uariables:Yt is the logarithm of trend per capita gdp, 
relatiue to the U.S.R. in year t. E is the rate of growth of employment (percent 
per annum). I is the auerage ratio of gross inuestment to GOP (percent). 
Estimation is by OLS. Rbsolute t-statisics are shown in brackets O. 
sources: summers and Heston (1984), OECO Labour Force Statistics and ILO. 
The regression equation is: 
q. = c + al. + bE. - a1nvt + e. I I I I 
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In the first regression, (just using Vt [i.e initial income level as the 
explanatory]), the negative coefficient indicates a tendency for 
convergence. 
In the second regression, adding employment growth and investment 
as explanatories to proxy for capital deepening and employment 
deepening, we find that their addition actuallu increases the 
significance of the coefficient for Vt. Had capital and employment 
deepening been the sole explanations of convergence, the coefficient 
on Vt would have gone to zero. But the opposite occurred. And, since 
TFP is derived as the residual growth once account has been taken of 
growth in employment and capital, Dowrick and Nguyen interpret the 
coefficient on Vt in the second regression as a measure of the rate 
of TFP catch-up. Thus they find TFP growth to be a much more 
significant cause of growth than capital or employment deepening. 
Table 1 0-Regression Analysis Of Growth Rates 1950-81: Samples 
Selected On 1 950 Income Rankings Of GDP 
Per Capita 
y N Dependent y1950 p R2 
Uariable 
0.25 27 Q/P -0.98(-2.05) .1438 
Q -1.72(-5.70) 0.47(3.94) 0.125(5.90) .7899 
0.20 32 Q/P -0.29(-0. 77) .0195 
Q -1.52(-5.28) 0.46(3.89) 0.128(5.93) .7662 
0.10 55 Q/P -0.04(-0.15) .0004 
Q -1.48(-6.18) 0.45(3.47) 0.139(6.50) .6195 
0.01 63 Q/P 0.22(1.01) .0164 
Q -0. 78(-3.08) 0.57(3.53) 0.114(4.28) .3762 
Notes:The dependent uariable is the annualized trend growth rate of real GDP 
(Q) or of real per capita GDP (Q/P). y is the minimum per capita income leuel of 
the sample (as proportion of U.S.) in 1950; all market economies in the data 
set with 1950 per capita income aboue this leuel are included in the sample. 
Y 1950, P, and I report the OLS coefficients (and t-statisics) on the logarithm of 
1950 per capita GDP, the annualized growth rate of population 1950-81, and 
the auerage percentage share of gross inuestment in GDP. 
Source: Summers and Heston (1984,+data tape) 
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In the above table, Dowrick and Nguyen proceed in a similar manner 
to table 9, but this time they incrementally alter the sample. When 
trend growth of per capita GDP is regressed on initial income only, 
only the richest twenty-seven countries show a tendency to 
converge. And, for the largest sample, it appears that perhaps 
divergence has occurred. But, when population growth (which proxies 
labour growth) and investment are included as explanatories, the 
coefficient on initial income (now interpreted as the rate of TFP 
catch-up) is significant for all samples. In fact, the rate of TFP 
catch-up appears to be similar for all countries (except the very 
poorest group of sixty-three). Dowrick and Nguyen say that the 
reason why income levels have not converged in the larger samples 
(in spite of the fact that TFP has) is due to low investment relative 
to population growth in the poorest countries. 
111. Reuiewing the Studies in Light of the Emoirical 
Issues Raised 
Although Baumol's "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and 
Welfare" has been criticised before, (see Delong), there are some 
further criticisms which have not been mentioned. Baumol uses 
Maddison's (1982) sample of sixteen rich countries in examining 
labour productivity from 1870 to 1979. This sample of course 
suffers from the ex poste sample selection bias we talked of 
earlier, in that any country that has failed to converge has been 
excluded from the sample, thereby guaranteeing that Baumol would 
find convergence. In addition, Maddison's figures for growth rates 
were calculated using backward extrapolation which as we have 
mentioned leads to a bias in favour of the convergence hypothesis, 
(Baumol in fact acknowledges this); Delong has since largely 
discredited this paper, and one of the means whereby he does this is 
to show that had Baumol taken into account this systematic error 
bias, he would have found significantly less (if any) tendency for the 
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data to converge. 22Maddison's data is also based on market exchange 
rates, and not on the PPP estimates, thus perhaps influencing the 
data to appear to converge less than it really does. Also, the data is 
not trended, which leads Baumol to the erroneous conclusion that 
convergence has virtually stopped since 1973, (Dowrick and Nguyen 
have found that convergence has continued past 1973 when trended 
data is used). 
Baumol tried to rectify these errors, in his and Wolff's 
"Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: Reply". Using 
Bairoch's (1976) data, they select an ex ante sample of eleven 
countries, chosen on the basis of their relative incomes at the half-
way point (1870) in their period 1830-1913. 
They use the mid-point rather than the beginning of the period 
because they suggest that using 1830 may also have sample 
selection bias, but in the opposite direction. 23 1 do not see this. In 
fact, when one looks at their results, they find that for the eight 
richest countries, incomes had begun to converge by 1860; so if 
they use 1870 as the year for choosing their ex ante sample, it is 
not clear that ex paste sample selection bias is not the case, (albeit 
in a lesser form than if they had used 1913). 
For 1830-60, they find divergence of per capita incomes for the 
full sample; and for 1880-1913 they get convergence of the top ten 
income countries, but not for all eleven. One criticism is that 
Bairoch's data is not based on PPP estimates; (however, this is 
perhaps quibbling, due to the nonexistance of a PPP estimated set of 
data which goes back to 1830). In addition, the data is non-trended, 
and thus will result in bias; whether the bias is in favour of the 
convergence of incomes or not depends on the relative cyclical 
distortion levels of the eleven countries. Bairoch's data 
also suffers from error bias due to the backward extrapolation 
problem, and thus any results based on his data which do not take 
this error into account, (via MLE or some alternate means), will have 
a significant bias in favour of convergence (especially considering 
the period is so long : eighty-four years). 
~ ..................................... -
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Baumol and Wolff also look at the period 1950-80 using Summers 
and Heston's (1984) data, which is based on PPP estimates. They 
look at seventy-two countries and find that the real per capita 
incomes of roughly the top half of the sample (in terms of income 
levels) have shown convergence, but that the whole sample when 
taken together does not show convergence. In particular, the top 
fifteen have shown strong convergence. My criticism again is that 
they do not make use of trended data, and thus their results are 
flawed; Dowrick and Nguyen show that using trended data for the 
same period and virtually the same sample (they exclude some lDC's 
which Bau mo I and Wolff leave in; [had Dowrick and Nguyen not 
excluded them, their results would have shown even less 
convergence]) that convergence is only marginally significant for the 
top twenty-seven income countries, and that for the top thirty-two, 
fifty-five, and sixty-three, no significant convergence has 
occurred. 24 
Delong, in his "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: 
Comment", criticises Baumol's (1986) use of an ex paste sample, 
citing bias. In his sample, Delong uses an ex ante selection criterion 
to rectify the problem. Using 1870 relative income levels for 
selecting those countries which looked like promising convergence 
candidates, Delong attempts to remove the sample selection bias of 
Baumol's study. Yet it is interesting that Baumol and Wolff criticise 
Delong's criterion, suggesting that making a choice based on 1870 
income levels may just have the opposite direction of sample 
selection bias (this is why Baumol and Wolff chose their sample 
based on mid-period levels). However, I do not agree with this 
criticism. Delong's criterion does not inherently contain bias as far 
as I can tell; indeed, it would seem to me that Baumol and Wolff's 
criterion would contain some left-over ex paste sample selection 
bias since they are using 1870 income levels, as I mentioned earlier. 
Since Delong's sample of twenty-two "once-rich" countries 
goes beyond the sixteen covered by Maddison (1982), Delong is 
forced to mix data from different sources. Not only does he use some 
of Maddison's sample, but also data from Summers and Heston 
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(1984), as well as Bairoch (1976) and several other sources. Some, 
(such as Summers and Heston) use PPP estimates, whereas others 
(such as Bairoch and also Maddison) do not. This makes Delong's 
results rather suspicious; one must question the compatability of 
these various measures, and how likely they are when combined to 
produce accurate results. 25 Further, as is the case with Baumol and 
Wolff, Delong fails to make use of trended data, which poses further 
questions regarding a bias toward or away from convergence 
(depending on relative levels of cyclical distortions in the sample). 
Of note, Delong does try to rectify the problem of backward 
extrapolation bias by using Maximum Likelihood Estimation instead 
of Least Squares, (thus allowing for measurement error in the 
dependent variable). His results are intriguing. He finds that when 
measurement error is assumed zero (as in OLS) there is a strong 
tendency toward convergence across the whole sample; however, 
when measurement error is assumed, no tendency toward 
convergence is present. This is an additional blow to Baumol's 
(1986) paper, in that even though the samples are slightly different, 
the extreme nature of Delong's result makes us question the validity 
of Baumol's result which does not take into account measurement 
error. 
Abramovitz (1989) has virtually the same empirical results as 
does Baumol(1986) with respect to the Maddison (1982) sample. But, 
although the same sixteen countries are covered, Abramovitz uses 
Maddison's (1989) data as well as the 1982 data, (the 1989 data 
covers 1913- 1986). So, in essence Abramovitz is not only 
reproducing Baumol's (1986) results, but also comparing them to a 
different period ( 1913-1986) in order to see if the convergence 
result is stable over time. As one would predict given the sample, 
Abramovitz comes to the conclusion that there has been convergence 
of labour productivity levels within the sample of sixteen rich 
countries. Due to the similarity of his data to Baumol's, his paper is 
subject to the same criticisms, such as sample selection bias (his 
sample of sixteen rich countries virtually guaranteed he would get 
convergence), use of non-trended data, use of non-PPP, and 
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systematic errors in estimation (which, as we have pointed out, is a 
significant problem). I will not go into further detail with respect to 
Abramovitz since my coverage of Baumol (1986) and also Delong 
(1989) has made the consequences of the above criticisms clear. 
Of the convergence-related papers I have read, Dowrick and 
Nguyen's "OECD Comparative Economic Growth, 1950-85:Catch-up 
and Convergence" does take into account several of the empirical 
issues raised. However I still have some misgivings regarding their 
results. They focus on the role of Total Factor Productivity in the 
catch-up hypothesis, and show that TFP catch-up has been occurring 
steadily from 1950 to 1985, (using Summers and Heston [1984] for 
1950-80, and OECD estimates for 1981-85; both of which are PPP 
estimates), among not only the OECD, but also for roughly the top 
sixty income level countries, (and at a relatively homogeneous rate). 
Their results are robust in that PPP estimates are used, and tested 
for correlation with other PPP estimates for the same period to 
ensure that their particular data source is not biased (they get 
correlations of about .95)26 ; they use trended data; they show that 
their results are consistent across sub-periods; they show that 
their result is not affected by sample selection bias, and so on. 
Their main result is to show that where income convergence has 
occurred, it has been due to TFP catch-up, and not increases in the 
growth of Factor Inputs. This explains the failure of many mid-
income and poorer countries to catch-up in income levels, since 
although they have experienced strong TFP catch-up, they have had 
low investment levels relative to population growth, which has 
partially offset the catch-up in TFP. 
My first concern is that , although Dowrick and Nguyen point to 
the fact that proportional TFP catch-up has been steady over sub-
periods from 1950-85, and that it is the driving force behind the 
convergence of income levels, this conflicts with what one would 
expect. The rate of TFP catch-up should be decreasing over time as 
countries move toward convergence; and yet, Dowrick and Nguyen 
show that there is no significant slowdown in the rate of TFP catch-
up. 27This is inconsistent with the convergence hypothesis. 
I . . 
I; .. , 
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My second concern is related. As pointed out earlier, a study 
which fails to take into account changes in the quality of capital and 
labour input over time will seriously overestimate the importance 
of TFP. Dowrick and Nguyen's paper has this problem. Had they 
accounted for changes in quality, it is a distinct possibility that 
their results would be much different, in that TFP would be shown to 
be much less important to income growth than is made out. It is also 
possible that my first concern regarding TFP catch-up's failure to 
slow down is in some way a byproduct of this misreading of the 
importance of TFP. 
Undoubtedly there are some empirical issues which will emerge 
from the literature which have not been covered here. Hopefully 
however, those that have been looked at will contribute to a better 
understanding of the many and varied convergence studies which 
have come out and no doubt will continue to. I have looked at the 
above papers in moderate detail, not only to provide an outline of 
some of the most important empirical work that has been done, but 
also in the hope that a critique of such studies will serve as a basis 
for looking at other papers done on the subject. 
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